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
RECURRENCE OF CIVIL WAR AND AFTER VIOLENCE: TOWARD A UNIFIED RESEARCH APPROACH

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Abstract

Enduring calm is difficult to achieve in the wake of civil conflict. Much of the scholarship on violent after war discusses why militant groups come back to the battlefield, which is relevant given that many contemporary armed conflicts are recurrences of earlier wars. There is still a high risk of various forms of violence in postwar settings, even if peace does ultimately triumph. There has been a growing body of work across disciplines exploring the causes and consequences of postwar violence. Using citing network analysis, we demonstrate that studies of war repetition and after violence have evolved separately, despite their interconnected nature. By separating postwar violence into distinct categories, we risk failing to see shared causes and responses. We show this by analyzing previous research on both of these interconnected areas. Despite the fact that war recurring and postwar violence reflect a set of similar risk variables, some risk factors might have opposing impacts on the two effects. We offer a new paradigm for the examination of terrorism in the wake of conflicts in an effort to break down the silos that have developed between the two domains of study, from which these kinds of discoveries can only arise. The framework may be seen as both a conceptual lens as well as an analytic instrument for studying and contrasting various types of violence in postwar settings. We then describe how the framework helps academics pursue an unified research agenda, including specific ideas for research issues that should be explored to further our knowledge of violence in the wake of conflict.

Keywords

Civil War, Postwar Violence, Civil War Recurrence, Conceptual Framework.

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1. Introduction

Continuing violence after a civil war disrupts efforts to rebuild peacefully. 1 In 1999, for instance, the Liberian civil war was restarted by the Liberation of angola United for Reconstruction and Democracy's (LURD) raids on government strongholds. The dissidents aimed to overthrow the government and seize power, having reformed from the group that opposed Charles Taylor's regime in the first war (Call, 2010). Why armed organizations like LURD re-emerge on the battlefield is the subject of much of the research on violence in post-conflict settings.

Since the large majority of current military conflicts occur in states that have already through a civil war, it is essential to comprehend the causes for the return of war in order to minimize further death tolls. However, if focus is limited to the prospect of future conflict, other acts of abuse that may arise in the shadow of civil war are ignored. The Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-M) diverged from LURD in their policy following the peace accord in November 2006. However, the CPN-M covered the fact that it was utilizing murder against the government and population by diverting its former fighters into the newly founded Young Communist League (YCL) (YCL). The Liberian government did react to the YCL's savagery, but not in a way that many would call a resumption to civil war.

An essential point is shown by the situations in Liberia and Nepal. However, despite their obvious similarities, these situations are often examined separately. Scholars of violent political recurrence, who study cases like Liberia, typically describe it as the resumption of terrorist acts between an authority and a rebel group more than a political incompatibility of a threshold severity. Scholars of postwar violence, which includes acts of physical violence that occur after a violent rebellion has ended but before a return to open hostilities, are interested in cases like Nepal. There is a vast body of research that examines the causes of postwar violence in many contexts, including political turmoil, violent crime, sexual violence, and ethnic confrontations.

There are three sections to this piece. To begin, we employ citation network study to demonstrate that scholars primarily investigate civil war recurrent and postwar brutality in

separate academic subfields. While separating the two aspects has helped researchers focus their efforts, we suggest that it has also hampered our ability to grasp the full scope of brutality in the wake of civil war.

Second, by contrasting the published research on these two linked outcomes, we highlight the flaws of compartmentalization. This analysis reveals two major takeaways. To begin, there is a correlation between the occurrence of civil war and the danger of postwar violence, and both elements have a shared set of precursors. This information, which might be crucial in guiding efforts to reduce violence in the wake of a civil war, has been kept secret thus far. Second, focusing solely on either civil war recurrence or postwar violence obscures the fact that different causes contribute to either result. Our analysis reveals that while civil war recurrence is reduced by military wins, international policing, and power-sharing measures, other types of postwar violence are increased by the same conditions. This information is crucial for policymakers who want to minimize unintended consequences without sacrificing efficacy. Again, this has been kept secret due to the effects of isolation.

Third, by offering a new conceptual framework, we hope to encourage an interdisciplinary research program on violence following civil war that is centered on filling these knowledge gaps. After a civil war has ended, whether by a peaceful resolution, military triumph, or low intensity, our approach accounts for all types of physical violence. This pattern of violence, which is an outlier relative to pre-war conditions, is connected to the first war in that its perpetrators or enabling environment originated in that fight. Our theory provides a perspective for categorizing postwar violence beyond the binary of war recurrence vs postwar violence. The framework may also be used as an analysis tool to find and define violent incidents that are comparable enough to be compared but are otherwise not. Based on this theoretical framework, we propose a research agenda designed to address the gaps in knowledge that have arisen as a result of the existing siloing of studies investigating the causes and consequences of war and the violence that follows it.

So, what we bring to the table is a new theoretical framework that asks issues that can be answered only by combining research on war repetition and postwar violence. We hope this will lead to new discussions and research that examines the causes and effects of violence in post-conflict settings from a broader perspective. After all, acts of violence don't necessarily "fit" into certain categories. Instead, what we perceive is determined by structural factors in postwar situations and the strategic decisions made by people. Understanding the causes of postwar violence requires taking a holistic view of the environment and options at play.

The following is the article's outline. Next, we give a conceptual map of the study disciplines by establishing the frequently accepted concepts of civil war recur and postwar violence. We then offer the citation analysis that demonstrates the separate academic groups working on the topics of war repetition and postwar violence. We then contrast the two types of research to demonstrate that it is only by examining the two together that we can get insight into common risk factors and unique outcomes. In light of these realizations, we suggest a paradigm to assist us design an integrative research program on violence in postwar settings.

2. Mapping the fields

Recurrent civil war and aftermath violence: what are they? Existing scholarly literature presents a mix of shared and unique definitions for these ideas. It is important to distinguish between times of war and times of peace since both civil wars and postwar terrorism occur in this transitional era. Even in a world without physical conflict, Galtung (1969: 183) notes, "a

vast amount of diversity is feasible" (Galtung, 1969: 168). This is in line with the goals of peace researchers like Steenkamp (2005) and Suhrke (2012), who give typologies of various postwar systems or kinds of peace (Davenport et al., 2018). The lack of physical violence is the focus of the research we analyze here, but peace is a multidimensional notion that can apply to more than just the absence of violence.

In addition, most prior research has concentrated on postwar settings, defined as those in which an armed conflict has formally ended as a result of a strategic conquest, a negotiated settlement, or a reduction in the number of casualties. 2 Nations whose armed hostilities have been "terminated" or "frozen" in terms of degree of violence also fall under the category of postwar countries. Most reports agree that a return to terrorist acts between an administration and a rebel group over a political mismatch that reaches a particular degree is what is meant by the term "civil war recurrence". This overarching description may be broken down into four distinct theoretical aspects. To begin, there is an open political discord between those least two parties, with one side taking issue with the other's governing structure or territorial jurisdiction. Second, there is a high enough level of aggression. The threshold at which violence becomes unacceptable is debatable (see, for example, Call, 2012), yet it is generally accepted that there must be one. Third, it is generally agreed that postwar violence is a legacy of the conflict, in the sense that its perpetrators or enabling factors are products of the civil war and hence would not have existed in their absence.

While crime is not limited to countries in the aftermath of war, it is typically classified as such when done by former soldiersor when non-participants in the conflict take advantage of the economic possibilities presented by the chaos of conflict. Steenkamp further explains how a "violent culture, which produces a socially permissible context within which violence may persist" (2005: 253) is to blame for the continuation of violence even after a conflict has finished. In keeping with these definitions, the scope of this study is limited to the physical manifestations of violence that persist long just after civil war has ended, whether via a negotiated solution, military triumph, or low intensity. Any appropriate subnational unit may be included in this definition. Multiple military confrontations may be ongoing in certain nations even after one finish. As a result, different levels of study produce different results when attempting to characterize postwar settings.

Citation network analysis

Figure 1 depicts the results of a citation network analysis that demonstrate the obvious separation between the study of civil war reoccurring and postwar violence, as well as the lack of integration and cross-fertilization between such two domains. Among the many bibliometric techniques, shared between users analysis is useful for illuminating the internal organization of a study topic and conveying the ways in which writers choose to group themselves, whether consciously or subconsciously. We undertake a search strategy for articles within each discipline, merge them into a shared server, and examine the linkages between them to evaluate the extent to which information is shared throughout the study domains of civil war recurring and postwar violence.

The results of this search provide a representative sample of 106 papers on postwar violence and 142 publications on the recurrence of civil wars. 5 VOS viewer is then used to do statistical analysis and visual inspection of the sample. Publications are depicted as circles in Figure 1 with the author's name and the year of publication listed next to each circle. 6 Publications associated with the post-Civil War violent literature are shaded dark gray, while those associated with the recurrence of civil war are shaded light gray. The act of referencing

another document establishes a connection between them. In this case, it's represented by a dark line. Clusters of publications have a high degree of similarity between them in terms of both their citation networks and the networks of those who cite them. 7 Only 163 of the 248 papers had links to other documents in the sample across both areas. Only articles with at least two external connections are included in the graph. To be an integral element of a network, a document needs at least two links, which is why this is the criterion used. A small network may be thought of as a group of three connected documents; for this network to function, each of these papers must have a connection towards the other two, for a grand total of two. Single-link documents can only be peripheral "tails" to larger integrated networks. 8 Figure 1 shows the resulting sample size of 130 documents.


Figure 1. War and violence after it have been the subject of a citation analysis [1]

First and foremost, a citation analysis shows that there is a distinct field devoted to the research of postwar violence. Since that was not the case, we couldn't say for sure. Experts on civil war slip ups focus on a more or more precisely defined outcome, while scholars of postwar violence study a broad range of outcomes, such as crime but instead homicide since war, gang violence, summary executions, civilian trying to target, sex offenses, political oppression and subjection, and communal violence. Despite this diversity, it appears that there is a group of scholars that connect with a literature studied, as shown by the close proximity of papers on postwar atrocities in the graph and also the various links between documents. There is a very small group of scholars who focus on the recurrence of military conflicts, especially in comparison to the larger society. The scope of the violence study field may not have been effectively reflected in our search parameters, critics may say. Despite the idea that no search can ever be expected to catch a field in its whole, we discovered that 25% of post violence tales we sourced had any citation connections to any other material in our database, and another 16% missed at least two links.

This suggests that while some academics consider themselves part of a study area on after violence, many others who are engaged in similar work do not. The second takeaway from the deep learning is that the study of civil war recurrence and after violence are distinct areas of study, as seen by the distribution of the graph's lighter and darker circles. Both light and dark circles could be more uniformly distributed if writers from both fields saw themselves as contributing to a wider literature on violence after civil war and drew on research from both fields with comparable frequency. Another key distinction between the two areas is the results that are of interest to each. In other word, the differences between the disciplines outweigh the

similarities. An example of a topic that cuts across many disciplines would be the causes themselves or the various research modalities used. If that were the case, we'd observe gaps inside the disciplines that are wider than the space between them, but that's not what we witness.

Most contribution on postwar aggression are more recent, which may explain both the extent of the postwar brutality net and the unidirectional citation pattern outlined above. That's why it's possible that the fields will converge over time. The gap that we observe between the two disciplines may potentially stem from methodological differences. There are a select number of publications that are widely read and referenced in both disciplines. Two such instances are Themnér (2011) and Boyle (2014). This is due to the fact that the violence they investigate may or may not lead to further civil strife. Their work straddles the divide between the two disciplines, but it does not provide a satisfactory explanation for why civil wars can erupt again while other types of violence persist in the aftermath of conflicts.

3. The pitfalls of compartmentalization

From a policy and academic standpoint, the separation of the two areas of study is problematic. Comparing and contrasting these two schools of thought allows us to highlight the flaws in the approach used by those who like to keep things separate. Rather than provide a comprehensive overview, we highlight two previously unnoticed features to show how the separation of the two domains creates problems.

Discounting shared risk factors

First, scholars may miss the core causes that lead to the continuation of violent warfare even after a revolutionary war has ended if they try to classify the factors that contribute to it under different headings. Inadequate consideration of common risk factors hinders the identification and development of policy measures that can stop crime following conflict generally, independently of its forms. We demonstrate this trap by studying the three factors—civil war intensity, the presence of armed groups and old girlfriend connections, and insufficient governance—that have been persistently connected to an increased chance of civil war recurrence and postwar violence. It has been shown in a number of studies that civil wars with a high death toll are more likely to erupt again and increase the likelihood of postwar violence of different types. To wit: (Boyle, 2014; Deglow, 2016).

Second, some studies have demonstrated that postwar contexts where armed actors maintain the potential to employ violence or in which a big pool of ex-combatants available for removal are more likely to encounter later civil conflicts. Studies of postwar violence have shown similar results, linking the presence of violent organizations or ex-combatant links to more acute breakouts of postwar violence.Even though these studies focus on different types of armed organizations or networks of ex-combatants, they all share the core premise that increased chances for violence can restart warfare or induce postwar violence. This process is commonly seen within a rational choice framework in the research on civil war recurrence, where the potential for violence increases the difficulty of making credible commitments. Scholars who study postwar violence make a similar connection, however they focus on conflicts among individual groups rather than within nations (Daly, 2014, 2016).

Third, issues associated with inadequate governance—such as weak political structures, authoritarian establishments, and female under-representation—have been connected to the recurrence of civil war.Similarly, several studies show that post-war violence flourishes in an

atmosphere when political, social, and certified are weak. One mechanism at play is that ineffective institutions make it more difficult for former enemies to make transparent and credible peace agreements, whereas effective institutions can aid these parties in overcoming such obstacles (Walter, 2015: 1245).

In conclusion, the meta-analysis shows that the causes and processes of future civil wars and post-war violence may be similar. However, this can only be achieved by a combined study of preexisting conditions and postwar violence in order to identify common risk variables.

Putting aside the possibility of competing effects

Second, researchers may fall prey to the trap of compartmentalization, which can cause them to overlook divergent effects, such as evidence that suggests one factor reduces the likelihood of civil war return while concurrently generating postwar violence. Negative unintended consequences of policy initiatives meant to lower the likelihood of violence in general may be obscured by failing to account for these varied impacts. To demonstrate, we talk about military triumphs, peacekeeping, and power-sharing, all of which have been found to raise the probability of specific types of violence in the years after a conflict.

Although there is some debate over whether or not the victorious side makes a difference, it is generally accepted that military victories decrease the likelihood of civil war breaking out again. The mechanism underpinning this is that winning armies are unable to regroup after a decisive victory because they cannot afford to do so. The claim that military triumphs lessen the likelihood of future wars needs to be qualified by a number of factors. For example, the effect tends to be mitigated when the winning side consists of a coalition of rebel parties, and it also depends on the sort of existing government and indeed the nature of any power-sharing arrangements that may have been reached (Mukherjee, 2006). But military successes have a considerably less pristine track record when it comes to postwar bloodshed. Boyle (2014) conducts a comparative study between many time periods and shows that strategic violence increases following military triumphs. Like Suhrke (2012), who mentions the violence that enveloped Rwanda following the genocide in 1994 as an extreme example of how a so-called victor's peace may be highly violent, I would add that there are many more examples. However, the process connecting military successes to subsequent violence differs from that connecting military victories to the return of civil conflict. The rationale for the use of force against civilians is that the new administration has to (re-)establish power and eliminate challenges to the new order. Such persecutions are only feasible when the losing party is weak. This process has been empirically shown for a number of post-war cultures, such Spain

Second, the likelihood of another civil war breaking out is lowered when foreign troops are present. As a key rationalist tool, peacekeeping missions prevent violent conflict resolution by reducing the likelihood that either side would resort to force. Peacekeeping's impact on postwar violence, on the other hand, has received less consistent attention from academics. A number of studies support peacekeeping's ability to reduce violence and indicate that it lessens instances of postwar violence such indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Other research has shown that peacekeeping operations may not be successful in preventing postwar violence. According to Salvatore's (2019) research, higher murder rates in war- and postwar-torn nations are correlated with the presence of more armed forces deployed during peace operations. Postwar violence committed by new armed organizations or armed groups not officially part of the battle against the government is found by Bara (2020) to have a similar effect. Several country case studies, such as those conducted on South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guatemala, and Cambodia, have documented the continuity in

levels of violence alongside a change in the type of conflict across war and postwar periods (Barma, 2012). Interestingly, these experiments often define (implicitly) a similar system as studies on peacebuilding and civil war incidence. Though these studies agree that peacekeepers reduce the likelihood of violence, they also warn that this deterrence is not effective for all types of aggression and may even encourage a resurgence of violence not covered by the peacekeepers' mission.

Third, power-sharing reduces the risk of rebellion recurrence, though the exact effect can be dependent on the design of power-sharing establishments or contextual factors. In addition, elections and democratic reform may be seen as a type of power-sharing and in some contexts, this can contribute to more long-lasting peace. One mechanism behind this link is because power-sharing measures serve as "fear-reducing provisions" that aid the signatories in overcoming credible commitment challenges associated with the peace agreement.

Another concerning conclusion is that power-sharing appears to enhance armed players' inclination to employ postwar violence in a variety of forms. Power-sharing agreements, which Daly (2014) calls "the dark side of power-sharing," can be effective in overcoming commitment difficulties among elites, but they can make commitment issues among commanders and mid-level generals much more difficult to resolve. Officers who felt "betrayed and angry" had a crucial role in remobilizing Colombian soldiers for violence following the end of La Violencia. Rizkallah (2017) notes a similar conundrum in Lebanon, where the political power-sharing system that ended the civil war kept the militias-turned-parties' population networks and structures intact, decreasing their begin costs for violent mobilizing for political benefit. And as Wilson (2016) demonstrates, while autonomy (a kind of territorial powersharing) helped bring an end to fighting in Northeastern India's Assam, it also encouraged rebels there to go after other ethnic populations and competing factions in an effort to control the rewards of victory. These studies demonstrate that power-sharing can backfire by exacerbating difficulties with genuine commitment inside armed organizations, keeping violent actors in place, and creating incentives to sabotage broader peace initiatives.

Finally, the synthesis demonstrates that some well-established characteristics that lessen the likelihood of a repeat civil war have contradictory impacts on postwar violence. When looking at civil war recurring and aftermath violence together, we can finally see these contrasting impacts.

4. Separation of concerns, revised framework

We have demonstrated that studying civil war re - occurrence and after violence in silos is counterproductive. In the following, we propose a fresh framework to go over this division of labor. This framework may be used in two ways: as a cognitive lens to classify various types of violence experienced by war's survivors, and as an analytical tool to make meaningful comparisons and pinpoint unique research issues. In the second half of this section, we lay out such issues as part of an overall field of study on crime in the wake of conflict. Classifying PostwarViolence,we introduce the concept by explaining how it might be used to classify various forms of violence in the wake of conflict. All three of these conditions must be met for a conflict to be considered armed conflict: the state must be involved, the nonstate opponent must be well-organized, and the fighting must be motivated by an overt ideological divide. We utilize these three criteria as a framework to categorize various types of violence according to their similarities and differences, generalizing them to encompass violence at every level of

analysis. 12 The State dimension includes all kinds of violence in which the state is a direct participant, either as an aggressor or a victim.

When we talk about "government," we're referring to the civilian and armed forces of a country or a province. Excluded from this sphere is violence between nonstate actors, such as private parties. Violent acts committed by a well-structured, non-state actor are included in the Organized category. Such an organization is stable and consistent, with a defined mission and organizational structure. Not only can violent groups like rebels and criminal gangs fall into this category, but so do otherwise lawful entities like political parties that resort to violence to achieve their goals (Sundberg et al., 2012). This does not include acts of violence committed by individuals or small, ad hoc organizations. Finally, terrorism with a political goal might be included under the Political category. The definition of "political" becomes murkier with the absence of the state. We both acknowledge that there are certain grey areas, but they are the exception. According to this concept, random acts of violence between unaffiliated persons do not constitute political violence. Nor is violence committed by gangs, mafias, or drug cartels.


Figure 2. Venn diagram of different types of violence in the aftermath of war [1]

For political reasons, non-state armed organizations engage in inter-group violence that is not directly sanctioned by a state. Such violence occurred, for example, between parties in post Lebanon and between armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Conflicts between armed organizations in the aftermath of war sometimes seem and feel like "a renewal of war by other means". Many of the war's violent players remain at large, either because their groups never dissolved or because they migrated into political power. As the state is not being directly attacked, nor is it officially participating, this violence cannot be considered a continuation or resurgence of the conflict. Nothing here rules out the prospect of official involvement as a covert supporting player, as the South African government did in the violence that swept across KwaZulu-Natal after 1990.

Unrest on a political scale include violent conflicts between state and a nonstate actor that is not legally constituted as a rebel group or political entity. Protests that become violent are a common source of this kind of unrest, as shown in the demonstrations that sparked the Dili riots of 2006 in Timor-Leste. Disgruntlement with the execution of new postwar administrations or frustration with the failure of peace treaties to address public issues are

common causes of political instability in the years following a conflict. Former members of a rebel organization might also incite it to further their postwar aims.

Violence committed by organized criminal groups against state is the final type of violence to meet two of the three conditions for the resumption of war. The state is at war with a formally established nonstate entity like a criminal organization, which has no political ideologies on the state. As a result of this level of violence, criminal organizations are pitted "not just against one another, but against the state itself". The gang violence that has plagued El Salvador after the end of the conflict is a prime example of this type of violence in a postwar setting.

Postwar cultures are more vulnerable to organized criminal violence, even when such violence occurs outside of civil war circumstances (the so-called Mexican Drug War as the most known example). Illicit economy may flourish in times of war, and the networks that are formed between combatants and criminals to support the conflict sometimes last long after the fighting has stopped. In addition, the availability of weapons, a weakened economy, and the demobilization for large numbers of troops and/or rebels all contribute to an increase in criminal activity in the postwar period. In contrast to the previous four types of postwar violence, which all share at least two characteristics in common, the next three types of violence share just one trait in common with the type of crime traditionally classed as civil war recurrence.

Interpersonal violence, shown by the rectangle outside the Venn diagram, is the only type of violence left after a war. It is described as "violence driven by personal ambitions or emotions and committed by individuals alone or in small circles of friends or acquaintances". Typical crimes include homicide, assault, rape, and acts of domestic abuse. The word "ordinary" implies that this type of violence occurs in all civilizations, including ones that have not had a civil war in generations. Thus, postwar scholars pay attention to this type of violence when it reaches levels that would be unlikely if the preceding war hadn't occurred, as was the case in Northern Ireland, Guatemala and El Salvador, northern Uganda, and the former Yugoslavia. We have not made this type of violence a primary emphasis in the citation analysis tools or the literature evaluation since it does not reflect any of the three features with war repetition in our paradigm. As a result, our paradigm is able to differentiate between wartime communal violence and postwar interpersonal violence.

Integrating the research agenda framework

We contend that the framework aids in bringing together the study of war recurring and postwar violence, avoiding the dangers of studying these two topics in isolation. We provide two overarching learning approaches for a unified research focus and explain how the framework might be used to facilitate these types of studies below.

The first tactic is to reverse the typical explanation structure, moving from describing the causes of effects to explaining the effects of causes. That is, rather than asking what explains incidence or a single type of postwar violence, academics should investigate whether types of violence are linked to which risks or policy responses. As a result of employing this method, we may better understand the elements that contribute to or mitigate the likelihood of violence in the wake of conflict. The reform of the security sector (SSR), for example, may be one. The purpose of SSR is to lessen the likelihood of protests by bolstering the credibility of the police and other security personnel. The ability of the state to enforce the law is another area that benefits from SSR. For instance, Berg (2020) demonstrates that a diversified officer corps and

effective civilian control decrease the likelihood of civil war breaking out again. In the same way that increased public trust and cooperation with law enforcement may help reduce some types of violence, so can more professional policing behavior. 15 However, there appears to be a dearth of research on the effects of a single factor on many varieties of violence in the wake of civil war.

Our framework may be used as a guide for analysis in such a study, helping to pinpoint all the different kinds of violence that need to be investigated. The framework can serve as a springboard for data gathering and as a resource for locating relevant prior studies on the effect of a certain risk factor on specific forms of violence. The facets and the way they highlight commonalities and distinctions between various forms of violence may also be used to theorize about the likely impact of various causes on diverse types of violence in the wake of conflict. The results of this type of coordinated study would be extremely useful for informing policy. Those who strive to stop violence in the wake of civil war, in whatever shape it may take, would do well to prioritize learning about the variables that raise or lessen the likelihood of violence generally. However, this approach may not be ideal for answering the question of why shared risk variables may result in such a wide variety of violent behavior in various settings. In the second tactic, we try to provide an answer to that very issue.

The second method for understanding the varied post-war violence trends is to compare and contrast the various forms of bloodshed that have occurred. In particular, studies are needed to provide light on the reasons for the return of war in certain circumstances and the continuation of violence in other forms, some of which bear striking resemblances to war recurrence in terms of the individuals engaged or the strategic objectives achieved by the violence. The systematic comparison of violence in this way holds promise for revealing circumstances that have opposing impacts on various forms of violence. Our literature analysis helped us identify some of these elements, but we still need a well-thought-out plan to investigate these countervailing influences. For instance, we recognize that the presence of armed peacekeeping soldiers is a potent deterrent to future wars. While successful in changing the political climate in which players operate, this may bring about unintended consequences like an increase in violence and murder (Salvatore, 2019) or a switch to alternative forms of aggression or actors. If we continue to exclusively compare specific types of abuse to their absence, instead of similar forms of violence, we will fail to notice changes in the nature and perpetrators of violence. Furthermore, we fail to provide policymakers with information about the possible negative outcomes of actions.

Our framework has dual functions in the context of such a research strategy: The first benefit is that it provides a method for academics to determine which categories of comparison are the most useful. The more similarities between forms of violence there are, the more useful it is to draw parallels between them. As a second benefit, our paradigm highlights the most fundamental concerns by making it very evident along which dimensions various forms of violence diverge. Why is there a disparity here, and may certain policy measures lead to a shift rather than a decrease in violent behavior? The need to investigate why the state is just not a player to the murder in one situation, such as postwar settings with insurgent violence (1), but is in another context, such as settings with violence by armed groups (2), is highlighted, for example, by comparing these two types of settings. Even yet, the state is frequently a significant actor in such bloodshed, either directly sponsoring certain rebel forces or indirectly through the hiring of pro-government militia to carry out mass killings on its behalf.

Nonetheless, this still begs the issue of why the state either engages in overt violence and sometimes carries out violence via proxies.

5. Conclusions

This paper has proposed a hybrid ground to serve as a bridge among data analysis on civil war chronicity and postwar abuse, and has described how this template allows to find accurately what was obscured by the dislocation of the pieces of academic: factors that influence risk of civil war depressive episodes but also postwar violence, and aspects that lessen the likeliness of one but increase risk of the other. As such, the framework adds by providing scholars with a conceptual lens and analytical tool with which to identify a variety of research issues that haven't received adequate systematic attention up to this point. As a result, academic research on postwar landscapes will become more applicable to policymaking. While certain fields of study have yielded valuable insights, it is clear that a more comprehensive research agenda is needed to shed light on the myriad ways in which postwar violence can vary and, ultimately, to aid in the development of effective policy measures to curb this phenomenon.

Finally, our approach may be extended to include an integrated analysis of violence during conflict. At a certain point, insurgent violence becomes civil conflict. However, civil war situations also host a variety of different types of violence involving several additional players. War breaks out when insurgents struggle with one another, when security forces prey on people, when militias carry out assassinations on behalf of others, when ethnic groupings collide, and when gangs compete for illegal commerce. Despite this general understanding, the study of conflicts often examines individual instances of political violence rather than their interconnectedness. Since this is the case, our paradigm may be of use to students of the American Civil War.

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